Fordham Law Review
Volume 15

Issue 2

Article 3

1946

Enemey Business Enterprises and the Alien Property Custodian, I.
Francis X. Fallon, Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Francis X. Fallon, Jr., Enemey Business Enterprises and the Alien Property Custodian, I., 15 Fordham L.
Rev. 222 (1946).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol15/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

ENEMY BUSINESS ENTERPRISES AND
THE ALIEN PROPERTY CUSTODIAN, I.
FRANCIS X. FALLON, JR.t

Introduction
Approximately three months after Pearl Harbor, the President established the Office of Alien Property Custodian 1 to deal with certain
specific and limited kinds of foreign property and property interests in
the United States. Included were only those types for which the already
existing blocking and freezing controls of the Treasury Department 2
were considered inadequate to protect the national interest after the
outbreak of war.3 The Executive Order delegated to the Custodian
' Member of New York Bar, former Assistant General Counsel, Office of Alien
Property Custodian.
1. EXEc. ORDER No. 9095, 7 FED. REG. 1971 (1942), as amended by EXEc. ORDER
No. 9193, 7 FED. REG. 5205 (1942). Although the Order was completely rewritten by
the amendment, it is commonly referred to as "Executive Order 9095, as amended." It
will be herein referred to simply as "the Executive Order." A further and more recent
amendment by EXEC. ORDER No. 9567, 10 FED. REG. 6917 (1945), will be treated
separately.
2. This jurisdiction was exercised under the famous "freezing order," originally issued
as EXEC. ORDER NO. 8389, 5 FED. REG, 1400 (1940) under § 5 (b) of the TRADING WITH
THE ENFmy ACT of October 6, 1917, as amended prior to December 13, 1941, 40 STAT.
415, 50 U. S. C. A. APP. § 616 (1914). EXEC. ORDER No. 8389 has since been frequently
amended. It Was rewritten in its preient form (subject to subsequent minor amendments)
by EXEC. ORDER No. 8785, 6 FED. REG. 2897 (1941) and is referred to as "Executive
Order 8389 as amended." For a complete documentation of the various amendments
and rulings, regulations, interpretations, licenses, etc., issued thereunder, see UNITED STATES
TREAS.

)EP'T,

DOCUMENTS

PERTAINING

TO

FOREIGN

FUNDS

CONTROL

(June

15,

1945)

and supplements (United States Govt. Printing Office), hereinafter referred to as
"Documents."
For discussions of the various legal aspects of foreign funds control, see, Brief of
the Treasury Department as anicus curiae, in Commission for Polish Relief v. Banca
Nationale a Rumaniei, 288 N. Y. 332, 43 N. E. (2d) 345 (1942); UNITED STATES TREAs.
DEP'T, ADAnuIsTRATIoN OF THE WARTIMiE

FINANCIAL AND

PROPERTY

CONTROLS OF THE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT (1942); Hearings on H. R. 4840 before Subcommittee No.
1 of the Committee on the Judiciary, 78 Cong., 2nd Sess. (1944) entitled Administration
of Alien Property; Reeves, The Control of Foreign Funds by the United States Treasury
(1945) 11 LAW & CONTEMP. PROa. 17; Littauer, Unfreezing of Foreign Funds. (1945) 45
CoL. L. REv. 132.
3. Generally speaking, the Custodian was given jurisdiction over foreign property
and interests, where because of their nature, exercise of affirmative, active powers of
ownership, management or supervision was considered necessary, as distinguished from
the comparatively negative, passive blocking and freezing controls exercised by the
Treasury. See Letter of Transmittal by the Custodian to the President of the Annual
Report of the Custodian's Office for the fiscal year ending June, 1944 (hereinafter
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discretionary jurisdiction4 over four principal types of such property
and interests, enemy business enterprises,5 enemy physical property
(real and personal),' patents (enemy and foreign),' and enemy property under judicial administration.8 The Treasury remained in control
in all cases where the Custodian was not given jurisdiction, or did
not exercise it. The Custodian, although thus limited as to property,
received far broader and more effective powers than those possessed
by the Custodian in World War I. The Treasury Department's previous peacetime powers were likewise substantially increased. Both
referred to as "Custodian's 1944 Report") and page 2 of such report; Myron, The
Work of the Alien Property Custodian (1945) 11 LAW & CONTEM. PROB. 76; Hearings,
supra note 2.
4. Section 2 of the Executive Order reads: "The Alien Property Custodian is authorized and empowered to take such action as he deems necessary in the national interest,
including, but not limited to, the power to direct, manage, supervise, control or vest,
with respect to: [listing the various types of property]." (italics added) The language
indicates the basic distinction between the jurisdictions of the Custodian and the Treasury.
The former's is discretionary, limited as to property, and requires positive, affirmative
and specific administrative action to become operative; the latter's under ExEc. ORDER
No. 8389, as amended, is automatic, non-discretionary and residual. The exercise of
jurisdiction by the Treasury, through general and special licenses, rulings, etc. is discretionary, however.
5. Section 2 (a) of the Executive Order. A "business enterprise" is any individual
proprietorship, partnership, corporation or other organization primarily engaged in, or
to the extent that it has an office in the United States engaged in, the conduct of business
within the United States. The term "enemy", unless the context otherwise requiies, will
herinafter be used for the longer term "designated enemy country", as defined in § 10
(b) of the Executive Order. Section 2 (b) gives the Custodian the same jurisdiction and
powers over foreign (non-enemy)- business enterprises, provided he certifies to the Treasury
"that it is necessary in the national interest" to exercise the same. The non-enemy business
enterprises over which the Custodian has asserted his authority are confined to those in
which nationals of enemy-occupied countries have interests, and the Custodian has limited his action to the exercise of supervision only, without vesting ownership interests.
They represent only a small fraction of the total business enterprises under his control.
CUSTODIAN'S 1944 REPORT, 6-7; 1945 REPORT, 11-12.
6. Section 2 (c) of the Executive Order refers to this "as any other property" of
enemy nationals, except liquid property and intangibles, which were left under Treasury
jurisdiction unless and until the Custodian determined that such property was "necessary
for the maintenance or safeguarding of other property" of the same enemy national,
subject to vesting under other sections of the Executive Order. This exception was
removed as to German and Japanese property by ExEc. ORDER No. 9567, 10 FED. REG.

6917 (1945); see

CUSTODIAN'S

1945

REPORT,

Ch. I.

7. Section 2 (d) of the Executive Order. Copyrights and trademarks, and applications,
contracts, rights and other interests relating to all three are likewise included.
8. Section 2 (f) of the Executive Order. Section 2 (e)gives the Custodian jurisdiction
over foreign ships. See CusToDrIA's 1944 REPORT 10, 127-128, 148; Knauth, Prize Law
Reconsidered (1946) 46 COL. L. Rav. 69.
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extensions of power were the the result of the amendment to Section 5 (b)
of The Trading with the Enemy Act made by Title III of the First
War Powers Act of 1941, effective December 18, 1941.1
By far the largest and most important part of the total property and
interests vested or controlled by the Custodian consists of business enterprises and interests therein.'" The net equity of the Custodian's vested
ownership interests in enemy business enterprises is roughly $150,000,000,
or approximately three-fourths of the total value of all property vested.
The 408 business enterprises in which the Custodian has vested enemy
ownership interests, have total assets of over $375,000,000," and
are of almost every conceivable type and form. They include individual proprietorships, partnerships, business trusts and associations,
non-profit organizations, domestic and foreign corporations, and domestic branches or agencies of foreign organizations of various kinds,
and engage in a wide variety of business activity. The interests vested
were almost entirely from German, Japanese and Italian former owners,
and the Custodian's proportionate equity in the respective enterprises
runs from an average minimum minority interest of 25% to complete
9. PUBrIc ACT No. 354, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 55 STAT. 838, 50 U. S. C. A. APP. §
616 (1941). For the legislative history and intent, see H. R. REP, No. 1507, 77th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1941) 3; SEN. REP. No. 911, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 2; 87 CONG. REC.
9801, 9828, 9855 to 9868, 9893 to 9895, 9946, 9947 (1941). See also Lourie, The Trading
with the Enemy Act (1943) 42 MIcH. L. Rsv. 205.
10. The total amount of foreign-owned property and interests of all types in this
country prior to the war has been estimated at fifteen and a half billion dollars, of
which somewhere between seven and nine billions at one time or another have been
subject to the blocking and freezing controls -of the Treasury Department. These two
figures include property and interests owned by allied, neutral, enemy-occupied and
enemy countries and their nationals. Total enemy property and interests discovered in
this country has been estimated at slightly over one half billion. Much of it has been
concealed or "cloaked", and additional items are still being brought to light. The Custodian has vested total property and interests of about one quarter billion, excluding
some 46,000 patents, 200,000 copyrights and 400 trademarks, and miscellaneous contract
rights and interests therein, also vested, upon which no valuation has been placed by
the Custodian's office. Total property and interests subject to direct or indirect control
of the Custodian's office are in excess of $400,000,000, however; not counting some
$85,000,000 of enemy business enterprise assets located in enemy and enemy-occupied
countries, which, until the end of the war at least, could scarcely be considered under
the effective control of the Custodian. See Hearings, supra note 2 and CUSTOoMx'S 1944
REPORT, ch. III, and pp. 34, 38, and 1945 REPORT, ch. II, pp. 17-26, wherein the information
appears in' statistical detail.
11. An additional $30,000,000 consists of assets of business enterprises owned by
nationals of enemy and enemy-occupied countries, under the Custodian's supervision,
but in which no interests have been vested. See CUSTODIAN'S 1944 REPORT 40; 1945
REPORT 56.
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ownership. Many of the enterprises, particularly those of former German nationality, contributed directly and substantially to the war
12
effort.
It is obvious that the activities of the Custodian in this field amount
to "government in business" on a vast and hitherto unprecedented
scale, unapproached in World War I, 3 and wholly inconceivable under
any circumstances other than those created by the impact of total war.
Basic problems of economic, political and social policy' in the relationship between public and private rights, government and business, national interest and individual gain, have arisen for re-examination,
bringing related legal questions for study and decision. The experience
of World War I has been of immeasurable value both to the government and to the public in considering these problems, but has been
somewhat less helpful to the bar, both in and out of government, in
seeking answers to the numerous and sometimes novel and difficult
legal problems which have followed upon the establishment and operation
of the Custodian's office. Our business economy, particularly in its
international aspects, became considerably more complex in the years
intervening between the two wars, and devices for foreign ownership
and control of property and interests in this country more numerous
and varied. Foreign interests were astute in devising new methods for
"cloaking", or concealing, benefidial ownership or control, in -anticipation of a renewal of conflict.' The complete scheme for control of
enemy property envisaged by the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917
rapidly became obsolete and inadequate, and even in advance of our
actual involvement in the war, it became necessary to establish a
wholly new and flexible system for coping with the modern means of
economic warfare employed by the Axis powers. 6 The new system,
instituted by the Treasury blocking and freezing controls, operated almost entirely by administrative, rather than legislative, action. It was
12.

For a more detailed description, see CUSTODIAN'S 1944 REPORT ch. V; 1945 REPORT

Ch. III.
13. Total value of property .of all kinds seized by the Custodian of World War I
was approximately half a billion dollars. See Hearings, supra note 2, p. 70.
14.
42.

See CUSTODIAN'S 1943 REPORT 12-14; 1944 REPORT 4, 16; 1945 REPORT 2, 10, 32,

15. See the Custodian's statement at the Hearings on Sen. Res. 107, 78th Cong., and
SEN. RES. 146, 79th Cong., before a Sub-committee of the Senate Committee on Military
Affairs, 79th Cong. 1st Sess., June 28 and 29, 1945,' entitled "Elimination of German
Resources for War", at 580 et seq. See also, Reeves, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 52 et seq.;
the CUSTOrAN's i944 REPORT 28-29; 1945 REPORT 8.
16. See Lourie, The Trading with the Enemy Act

210-211 (1943).

(1943)

42 MicH. L.

REv. 205,
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only natural that this pre-war experience was largely drawn on in fashioning instruments for dealing with enemy property after war was begun.
Administrative action under broad legislative and executive delegations of power, was adopted, and the more specific legislative
provisions of World War I largely disregarded. The First War
Powers Act, although in form an amendment to the earlier statute,
in fact was the beginning of a quite different and elastic method for
dealing with enemy property. The bill was drafted several months
before the Custodian's office came into existence, and there is indication that it was considered by its framers merely as a logical extension of the pre-war powers of the Treasury, to be exercised in the
same manner, and by the same agency.'7 Moreover, the Act was considered by some (and perhaps designed) as a virtually autonomous
and complete legislative enactment, independent of the World War I
statute, and self-sustaining. 8 New concepts of power, new powers, and
a new status were given to the Custodian; new terms and definitions
were used in describing persons and property subject to the statute.
But the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 remained on the books,
and was even given new life by the declaration of War. 9 Immediately,
however, some provisions of the old statute became in terms inapplicable; other provisions appeared inconsistent, contradictory and difficult
if not impossible of application in the light of the amendment; the
applicability of still other provisions became matters for the courts to
decide.2"
Finally, the experiment in wartime dual control of foreign property
and interests, as established by the division of jurisdiction between
the Treasury and the Custodian, was virtually without precedent in
17. See the statement of Ansel F. Luxford, Assistant General Counsel of the Treasury
Department for Foreign Funds Control, at Hearings, supra, note 2, pp. 69, 73; and Committee Reports, supra note 9. The bill was introduced, passed and signed with record speed,
eleven days after Pearl Harbor. It does not, however, show convincing signs of draftsmanship as hasty.
18. See McNulty, Constitutionality of Alien Property Controls (1945) 11 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB.

135.

19. Aside from a few provisions limited in terms by specific dates of effectiveness
or applicability, there is little in the statute to indicate that the Congress did not
intend it to apply to any war, present or future, in which the United States found itself
engaged. See, for example, the definitions of enemy and ally of enemy, and of the
beginning and end of war, in § 2; the blanket legislative prohibitions in § 3; the pro-

vision for the Custodian in § 6 and the substantive powers given the Custodian in
§§ 7 and 12.
20. Markham v. Cabell, 325 U. S. 847 (1945); Lourie, op. cit. supra note 9, at
216-220.
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World War L21 Administrative delegation by the President of wartime
regulatory powers, under both old and new statutes, to the Treasury2 2
and the Custodian,' and of wartime "vesting", or seizure powers under the new statute only' to the Custodian,24 created additional difficulties. The Custodian's office also became an instrument -of dual
control, in that it was given vast governmental regulatory powers as
well as the ordinary and well-recognized rights and powers of private
ownership under domestic law. These two quite different bases of authority were at the same time differences in status and function.; in
some cases they supplemented, in others duplicated or overlapped
each other. In still others, possibilities of conflict of activity and even
of interest arose. There was also the question whether the Custodian's
i'vesting" powers in World War II were the same or different, greater
or less, than his "demand and seizure" powers in World War I; 2 5 and
to what extent the array of judicial decisions dealing with the incidents
of the latter were applicable to the former.2
All of these circumstances have resulted in the emergence of a
number of legal problems which are only now being subjected to judicial and legislative scrutiny. As was the case after the last war, it
may reasonably be expected that, many years will elapse before all
21. For a relatively brief period, the administration of enemy patents in World War
I under §10 of the TRAmNG wzT THE ENE= ACT was delegated to the Federal Trade
Commission. Subsequent amendments to §§ 7 (c) and 12 of the Act, however, authorized the Custodian to seize and dispose of such patents. See Farbwerke v. Chemical "
Foundation, 283 U. S. 152 (1931); Hicks v. Anchor Packing Co., 16 F. (2d) 723
(C. C. A. 3d, 1926).
22. General License by the President under § 3 (a) of the TRADnwG WITH TE ENEmy
ACT, December 13, 1941, appearing in DOCUMENTS, op- Cit. supra note 2, p. 3; §§ 3
and 12 of the Executive Order.
23. The Executive Order, however, nowhere expressly confers on the Custodian
the powers formerly given him by statute under §§ 7 and 12 of the TRADING WiTH TiE
ENEMtY ACT. There may even be question whether the "Office of Alien Property
Custodian" created by the Executive Order was intended to be the same as the "Alien
Property Custodian" provided for by § 6 of the statute.
24. The Treasury also has vesting power, but must turn over vested property (except
that belonging to a foreign government or central bank) to the Custodian for administration, under § 3 of the Executive Order.
25. See Dulles, The Vesting Powers of the Alien Property Custodian (1943) 28
CoRN. L. Q. 245; Carlston, Foreign Funds Control and the Alien Property Custodian
(1945) 31- Coiu. L. Q. 1 ;. McNulty, op. cit. supra note 18.
26. Such decisions dealt with the effect of a taking by the Custodian against former
owners, 'or third parties; the conclusiveness of his findings; his status as an individual owner, mortgagee, creditor, stockholder, partner, patentee, or licensor under
federal and state law; his powers of administration, liquidation or disposition of seized
property under federal and state law; his obligations to claimants and suitors.
..
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have been solved, one way or the other. Some may only be solved
by international action ' through treaty or convention, or at peace
conferences; some others, happily, are presently on their way to judicial or legislative solution. Only a few have actually been solved.
Meantime, the Custodian's office has been functioning steadily and its
work progressing. At least in the business enterprise field, the initial
phase of vesting or seizure- of enemy property and interests seems to
have been largely completed, but for a few odds and ends.2 7 The
process of administration or liquidation is in advanced stages, and the
,program for sale or other disposition of vested property and interests
well begun. More recent developments 2 indicate that the final phases,
adjudication of claims and suits, and return of property and interests
vested, are already on the threshold. It may therefore be an appropriate point at which to attempt an appraisal of some of the legal
problems with which the Custodian has' dealt, and continues to deal,
in the most significant of his fields of activity, that of enemy business
enterprises. An effort will be made to discuss the problems in the order
of the various phases of activity to which they relate: vesting, administration, etc. A necessary preliminary to any such discussion, however,
is an examination in some detail of the bases of the Custodian's
jurisdiction and powers.
The Statute and the Executive Order
By amending Section 5 (b) of the Statute, Congress gave the President (or his delegate) sweeping regulatory powers over any and all
property in which any foreign interest existed, and in addition, the
vesting power. 2 ' The jurisdictional basis of the powers conferred
27. That is, insofar as the Custodian's vesting power under ExEc. ORDER No. 9095 as
amended by 9193, is concerned. The further amendment by ExEc. ORDER No. 9567 involves a -substantial extension of the Custodian's vesting power, which is largely beyond
the scope of this article. See note 6 supra.
28. Markham v. Cabell, 325 U. S. 847 (1945). Pub. L. No. 322, 79th Cong., 2d Sess.
(March 8, 1946), Pub. L. No. 671, 80th Cong. (August 8, 1946) adding §32-37 to the
Trading with the Enemy Act.
29. Section 5 (b) gives the Custodian, as the delegate of the President, broad power
o,". . . investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any
acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal . . . of, or dealing in, or
exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any
property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest, by any
person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States..."
The statute further provides that: "Any property or interest of any foreign country or
national thereof shall vest, when, as and upon the terms, directed by the President [in
the Custodian] . . . and such interest or property shall be held, used, administered,
liquidated, sold or otherwise dealt with in the interest of and for the benefit of the
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is both in personain and in rem. It should be carefully noted,
however, that although broad regulatory powers exist over "any
property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any
interest", the vesting power extends only to the "property or in'terest" of such foreign country or national. This is indication enough
that Congress did not intend American property interests to be expropriated by our government 0 ° This is the source of the vesting and
regulatory powers delegated to the Custodian. He must exercise them,
however, only with respect to the property and interests of "designated
enemy countries", or "nationals" thereof.3 ' Such nationals are, of
course, but a limited class of the "foreign nationals" referred to.
but nowhere defined in the statute. Impliedly, the power of definition
was likewise delegated, and recourse must be had to Executive Order
8389 as amended, for its various meanings.32 "National" 3 is there
United States. . ." Any and all incidental powers for carrying out the statutory mandate are granted'; the keeping and rendering of records and reports under oath,
and the production of books and records (but probably not the testimony of witnesses)
may be required; and complete exculpation from liability is given to anyone complying
with any "rule, regulation, instruction or direction" of the Custodian. A similar exculpatory provision appears in § 7 (e) of the old Act. American Exchange Bank v.
Garvan, 273 Fed. 43 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921), aff'd. 260 U. S. 706 (1922);' Garvan v. Commercial Trust Co. 262 U. S. 51 (1923). Silesian Amer. Corp. v. Alien Prop. Custodian,
156 F. (2d) 793 (C. C. A. 2d, 1946).

30. See Committee Reports and Congressional Record, supra, note 9. This distinction
is not so carefully or clearly preserved, however, in the delegation of these powers'

-

from the President to the Custodian. See Carlston, op. cit. supra note 25.
31, Section 10 of the Executive Order. These are the foreign countries against.
which the United States has declared the existence of a state of war. Such nationals.
are hereinafter referred to as "enemy nationals". For a different use of the term
"enemy national", in connection with trade or communication, see Treasury Gen-*.
eral Ruling 11, DoCuMNrENTS 25. For the limited cases where the Custodian's jurisdiction;
extends to property or interests of foreign (non-enemy) nationals, see notes 5, 7 and S
supra.

32. The definitions have likewise been impliediy ratified by Congress," in § 302' of
Title M of the FIRST WAR PoWERs AcT, 55 STAT. 840, g0 U. S. C. APP.- § 617 (1941).
See United States v. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U. S.304 (1936); United States v. Von Clemna,
136 F. (2d) 968 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943), cert. denied, 320 U. S.769 (1943), indicating that
in the field of foreign affairs, especially in time of war, the delegation of power to the
executive is far broader than in peacetime domestic affairs. Cf. Panama Refining Co. v.,
Ryan,, 293 U. S. 388 (1935).

.,

33. Section SE of Exac. ORDER 8389, as amended. "National" is, of course, the basic,
term; "foreign" (non-United States) is clear enough. A third classification, intermediate
between 'foreign" and "designated enemy" ap.pears as "foreign country designated .in:
this order" in § 3. A still different classification, that of "designated national" is used
by the Custodian in his General Orders 5, 6 and 20. 7 FED. REG. 6199 (1942) 8 FED" REG.
""
1780 (1943).
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defined to include: (1) any person 34 domiciled in, or a subject, citizen
or resident of a foreign country; (2) any partnership, association, corporation or other organization organized under the laws of, having its principal place of business in, being controlled by, or a substantial part"
of the ownership interests in which are owned or controlled directly
or indirectly by, a foreign country or national thereof; (3) Any person
to the extent acting or purporting to act directly or indirectly for the
benefit or on behalf of any foreign national; 36 and (4) any other
person who there is "reasonable cause to believe" is a foreign national.
The most sweeping provisions are, of course, the latter two. The
retroactive effect of all the definitions, is, however, frequently overlooked. A (foreign) "national" is any person who fell within the requirements of the definitions "at any time on or since the effective
date" of Executive Order 8389 as amended, which is no later than
June 14, 1941. Subsequent change of residence or status or cessation
of active hostilities, make no difference.3"
These definitions control the Custodian's -determination of who are
34. "Person" includes partnership, association, corporation or other organization (§
SC of ExEc. ORDER 8389 as amended).
3.
25% is the unofficial rule-of-thumb minimum generally adopted both by the Treasury and the Custodian's Office in determining whether a business enterprise or other
organization comes within its respective regulatory powers. It is not prescribed as a
minimum by the Statute or either executive order, and under special circumstances,
smaller percentages have been considered sufficient. CusToDA-N's 1944 REPORT 9, 25.
Either agency can, of course, regulate or vest, as the case may be, the interest itself,
regardless of the smallness of its size. Prior to the amendment of the Executive Orders
by EXEc. ORDER 9567, the Custodian generally followed a policy of vesting interests in
business enterprises only when they. were substantial, and represented under the respective circumstances actual or potential, direct or indirect, control of the enterprise.
It mnay reasonably be expected that all interests of German and Japanese nationals in
business enterprises will now be vested, however small. See note 6 supra, and CSTonx 's
1945 REPORT 31. For a definition of "control", see Daimler Co. v. Cont'l. Tire & Rubber
Co., 2 A. C. 307, 344-345 (1916).
'36. -Cf. § 3 (a) of the Statute, making it 'unlawful to trade, directly or indirectly, bn' behalf of, or for the benefit of an enemy. Presidential Proclamation 2497
of July' 17,' 1941 6' FED. REG. 3555 authorizes the publication of "The Proclaimed List
of iCertain Blocked Nationals;" i.e., persons who were deemed to be within this subsection' or under the "control" provisions of the one immediately preceding. Presence
on the Proclaimed List was insufficient in itself, however, to constitute a person an enemy
national. The Custodian must make a separate determination to such effect under Exn:c.
ORDER -9095, as amended. He has not usually done so with proclaimed nationals unless
special "additional circumstances existed. CUSTODIAN'S 1944 REPORT -8-9. The Proclaimed
List 'was withdrawn July 8, 1946, 11 FEn. REG. 7567.
-37.
Swiss Insurance Co. v. Miller, 267 U. S. 42 (1925); Farmers Loan & Trust Co.
v. Hicks, 9 F. (2d) 848 (C. C. A.:2d, 1925), cert. denied, 269 U. S. 583 (1925). Cf.
A. P. C. General Counsel's Opinion F-9, October 29, 1942.
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enemy nationals, with certain limited exceptions. A person not within
an enemy country shall not be deemed an enemy national unless the
Custodian determines (1) that such person is controlled by, acting
for or on behalf of, (including "cloaks" for) a person within an enemy
country; 8 (2) that such person is within an enemy-occupied country
and is also a citizen or subject of an enemy country; -or (3) that "the
national interest requires" such person to be treated as an enemy
national.3 9
The most significant features of the new definitions are their retroactivity and flexibility.4 0 Citizenship, residence, place of organization
and place of doing business are no longer the sole criteria. Indicia of
agency and control have been added, as well as the "reasonable cause
to believe" and "national interest" tests, giving a vast field for the
exercise of administrative discretion in the making of findings and
determinations.
Exercise of the Custodian's Powers: Vesting

A. Findings and Determinations
The Custodian exercises his powers of vesting or supervision 4 of
business enterprises or interests therein, .by the execution of specific
38. Cf. § 7 (c) of the Statute.
39. Section 10 (a) of Executive Order 9095, 7 FED. REG. 1971-, as amended by ExEc.
ORDER 9193, 7 FED. REG. 5205. It seems fair to assume that the phrase "within an
enemy-occupied country" in this section is limited to presence there during the actual
period of enemy occupation. The Executive Order has no separate classification for
persons resident in enemy-occupied territory. The Custodian has tended, however, to
treat them as a group. See CUSTODraN'S 1944 REPORT 6-7, 1945 REPORT 6, 7, 13; and
releases by the Custodian under APC General Orders No. 5 and No. 6, 7 FED. REG. 6199
(1942); 8 FED. REo. 1780 (1943).
40. The new definitions are to be compared with the simpler, narrower and less
flexible ones in the old statute: "enemy" there depended on residence, doing business or
incorporation within enemy or enemy-occupied territory. Beyond that, the President
could proclaim as enemies only individuals, Who must be "natives, citizens, or subjects"
of enemy countries. United States citizens resident in the United States and corporations
organized in the United States, were excluded. TRADING WiTH =H ENEMY ACT or 1917,
§ 2 (1) (a), (c). The same definitions applied, tnutatis inutandis, to "ally of enemy"
§ 2 (2) (a), (c). "Enemy" includes United States citizens resident in enemy territory,
Kahn v. Garvan, 263 Fed. 909, 915 (D. C. N. Y. 1920); and under the wording of
the statute, United States citizens residing in enemy-occupied territory as'well. 'The. shortcomings of the old definitions under present conditions are pointed out in Lourie, "Eneriy"
Under the Trading with the Enemy Act (1943) 42 Mcr. L. REv. 383, 387;.'And
Note (1942) 51 YALE L. 1. 1388. See also Matter of Biering, and Matter of Klotz and
North American Investing Co., Final Determination of A. P. C. Vested Property Claims
Committee, December 1943, to March 1946", U. S. Gov't Printing Office, 24; 108.
41. "Supervision" is the normal form adopted by the Custodian for the exercise of
his regulatory (non-vesting) powers over specific property, interests or enterprises.
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orders,4 2 designated by number, identified by the name of the enterprise or former owner of the property or interest vested, published
in the Federal Register,43 and served on the proper parties.4 Since
his' jurisdiction is limited by the Executive Order, his orders contain
certain "findings" and "determinations" to bring his exercise of jurisdiction within its provisions.45 Commonly accepted administrative law
doctrine requires findings of fact to be specific, not merely a repetition
or rephrasing of the statute or executive order delegating the powers
to the administrative agency.46 In the light of this requirement, the
differentiation between "findings" and "determinations" made in the
Custodian's vesting and supervisory orders is somewhat curious.
The findings employed by the Custodian are generally of two kinds:
(1) Residence of the person whose property or interest is to be vested
or supervised, and (2) ownership of the property or interest involved.
When nationality is based on residence in an enemy country, the finding is usually a specific reference to the city or other locality within
the country where the national resides." If the finding of enemy
nationality is based not on residence in an enemy country but on
agency, control, or "cloaking", the address of the principal party or
beneficial or true owner within the enemy country is usually identified in
the same manner."' Residence of an enemy citizen or subject within an
42. The vast majority of these orders are of two types, Vesting Orders and Supervisory Orders (hereinafter referred to as "V. 0." and "S. 0.", respectively, with number,
name and Federal Register citation). These orders, are clearly in the language of § 5
(b) and the Executive Order, rather than that of § 7 (c) of the Statute.
43. Section 7, FED. REG. AcT 49 STAT. 502 (1935) 44 U. S. C. A. § 307 (1945).
A. P. C. General Counsel's Opinion F-1, July 22, 1942. For reasons not entirely apparent,
Supervisory Orders and Termination Orders (terminating supervision) are not published
in the Federal Register. CUSTODIAN'S 1944 REPORT, 12 n..
44. Cf. Miller v. Rouse, 276 Fed. 715 (S. D. N. Y. 1921); Miller v. Lautenburg,
239 .N. Y. 132, 145 N. E. 907 (1924). A. P. C. General Order 33, 10 FED. RrG. 1363
provides, in effect, that vesting orders are effective when filed with the Federal Register;
and that actual notice of the order, by service or otherwise constitutes notice that the
Custodian has "undertaken supervision" of the vested property or interest, and that the
property or interest vests in the Custodian as of the time of filing with the Federal
Register.
45. Hunter v. Central Union Trust Co., 17 F. (2d) 174 (S. D. N. Y. 1926).
46. -See Securities Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 80 (1943);
Florida v. United States, 282 U. S. 194 (1931). Ordinarily, the courts do not distinguish
between findings and determinations.
47. See V. 0. 2162, American Wine Co. 8 FED. REG. 14868, Executive Order, § 10
(a).. Residence apparently means more than mere physical presence, Josephberg v. Markham, 152 F. (2d) 644 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945); Stadtmuller v. Miller, 11 F. (2d) 732
(C. C. A. 2d4 1926y; note (1946) 55 YAL. L. J. 836.
48. See note 47 supra; V. 0. 635, Frederick Pustet Co., 8 FED. REG. 1296 (shares
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enemy occupied country is likewise so identified.4" However, the Custodian's jurisdiction is based quite as much upon "determinations"5'
of nationality as upon findings of residence, 5' and these he invariably
couches merely in the general language of the Executive Order, whether
they be determinations of agency, control or "cloaking", or that "the
national. interest requires" the person to be treated as an enemy
national. 2 It is recognized that, especially in wartime, the same national interest might well forbid disclosure of the facts upon which
such determinations are made; nevertheless, a person seeking to attack
such determinations is at a disadvantage when the question of
enemy nationality is not merely one of residence. Agency, control or
"cloaking" determinations have been attacked, however, under Section
registered in name of Swiss neutral, beneficially owned by German resident); Executive
Order § 10 (a) (i).
49. See Executive Order § 10 (a) (ii). The Custodian may also vest or cut off
the interests of unknown enemy nationals. Cf. Northern Trust Co. v. Woodson, 72 F.
(2d) 723 (App. D. C. 1934), cert. denied, 294 U. S. 705 (1935). Miller v. Lautenburg,
209 App. Div. 608, 205 N. Y. Supp. 214, 218 (1st Dep't 1924) aff'd. 239 N. Y. 132 (1924).
A. P. C. General Counsel's Opinion F-8, Oct. 22, 1942.
50. The Executive Order speaks nowhere of the necessity for "findings" by the Custodian, but only of "determinations." See §§ 2, 2 (b), 2 (c), 5, 10.
51. Cf. V. 0. 230, Republic Filters, Inc., 7 FED. REG. 9094, where, as to 5 of the
493 shares vested, no factual findings of residence or ownership were made. The deficiency
was subsequently remedied, however. V. 0. 2843, Republic Filters, Inc., 8 FED. REO. 17528.
52. These "blanket" determinations are invariably made, regardless of the presence
of fact findings of place of residence. See V. 0. 161, Draeger Shipping Co. 7 FED. REG.
8568; V. 0. 764 Katsuji Onishi, 8 FED. REG. 2452; V. 0. 346, 347, Amerlux Steel Corp.,
and amendments 7 FED. REG. 11033; 8 FED. REG. 33, 6187; 9 FED. REG. 815, and supra,
note 47. Under § 10 (a) of the Executive Order, unless the person is within enemy territory,
or is an enemy citizen or subject and within enemy-occupied territory, such additional determinations by the Custodian are necessary to make 'such person an enemy national. CusTODIAn's 1944 REPORT 5-6, 1945 REPORT 4-5. The orders usually contain a final recital that
the Custodian has "made all determinations and taken all action, after appropriate consultations and certification, required by said Executive Order or Act or otherwise." For an interesting vesting, containing a variety of findings and determinations covering a number of
different fact situations, see V. O. 14, Spur Distributing Co., 7 FED. REG. 4399, as amended
and supplemented July 11, 1944, 9 FED. REG. 8083. The original vesting was before the
amendment to the Executive Order, and recited that the shares of stock, registered in the
name of one non-enemy and deposited with another "as collateral for a loan made to
Fritz Von Opel, are the property of Nationals of a foreign country designated in Executive Order No. 8389 as amended, as defined therein, and that the action "taken herein
is in the public interest, and hereby directs that such property, including any and all
interest herein, shall be and the same hereby is vested Mnthe Alien Property Custodian
."
The amendment made detailed findings and determinations concerning residence,
beneficial ownership and control, by various persons, including an internee and a Swiss
corporation-almost every situation envisaged by the Executive Order as amended. The
vesting of the stock "including any and all interest therein" was repeated.
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9 (a) of the Trading with the Enemy Act.55 These attacks have been
permitted by the courts despite the studied attempt of the Executive
Order to make determinations .or action by the Custodian thereunder
conclusive.5 4 So far as is known, however, no attack has yet been
directed solely against a "national interest" determination of enemy
nationality; nor have such determinations, although always made, ever
been used to sustain a vesting where other findings or determinations
in the order (enemy citizenship, residence, agency, control or cloaking)
were held erroneous. Apparently the only group of cases where the
Custodians vestings are grounded on "national interest" determinations
alone are those involving internees, where the fact that the internee
was an enemy citizen or subject would not be enough to bring him
within the Executive Order, in view of residence in this country rather
than in an enemy or enemy occupied country. 5
53. Draeger Shipping Co. v. Crowley, 49 F. Supp. 215 (S. D. N. Y. 1943) also, 55
F. Supp. 906 (S. D. N. Y. 1944); Duisberg v. Crowley, 54 F. Supp. 365 (D. C. N. J.
1944) aff'd per curiam, 149 F. (2d) 812 (C. C. A. 3d, 1945); Iki v. Markham, unreported
(D. Wash. 1944); Hayden v. Markham, unreported (D. Wash. 1944); Standard Oil Co. v.
Markham, 57 F. Supp. 332 (S. D. N. Y. 1944), also 61 F. Supp. 813 (S. D. N. Y. 1945),
64 F. Supp. 656 (S. D. N. Y. 1945); Neubersee Finanz Corp. v. Markham(D. C. 1945); cf. Alexewicz v. General Aniline & Film Corp., 181 Misc.
F. Supp. 181, 43 N. Y. S. (2d) 713 (Sup. Ct. 1943)
54. Sections 10 (a), 12 and 13. See Lourie, op. cit. supra note 9.
55. See CuSTOmAN'S 1944 REPORT 8; A. P. C. General Counsel's Opinion F-5 (Aug. 6,
1942; but cf. V. 0. 764 Katsuji Onishi, 8 FED. REG. 2452, finding Katsuji Onishi "a subject of
Japan interned in the United States," and "therefore" an enemy national. Cf. Ex parte
Kawato, 317 U. S. 69 (1943) and Ex parte Colonna, 314 U. S. 310 (1942). The court
in Josephberg v. Markham, 152 F. (2d) 644 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945), although placing its
decision on the ground that the Custodian's finding (V. 0. 1911, 8 FED. REG. 11187 (1943))
of enemy residence was erroneous, also held that the property vested (cash and securities),
because of its nature and because of the existence of active judicial supervision by a
New York court, the absence of any control over the property by its former owner,
and because of the Treasury freezing controls, could not and would not be used for
war purposes in the interest of the enemy. Thus the court indirectly reviewed the
"national interest" determination in the vesting order as well. The Statute (Sec. 5b)
makes no mention of "national interest" as a basis for vesting, and of course, no provision for judicial review of "national interest" determinations by the Custodian. See
note (1946) 55 YALE L. J. 836, and Carlston, op. cit. supra note 25, at 10, 14. The
statute (supra note 29) provides only that vested property "shall be held, used, administered, liquidated, sold or otherwise dealt with in the interest of and for the benefit of
the United States." The executive order, in addition to authorizing the Custodian to
make determinations of every nationality on the ground of "national interest" (Sec. 10
(a) (iii)), provides (Sec. 2) that the "Custodian is authorized and empowered to take
such action as he deems necessary in the national interest," including the power to regulate
or vest. It would seem that the Court in Josephberg v. Markham in effect reviewed the
Custodian's vesting order -under this provision, rather than merely his determination
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Findings of ownership may, vary in significant respects. The order
may recite that the named enemy national owns (and the Custodian
vests or supervises) certain property specifically described in the body
of the order or in an'exhibit attached; 5' or merely that "all property" 57
owned by the enemy national is vested or supervised by the Custodian; 5
or, that "any and all right, title and, interest" of a named enemy national in and to certain property (specifically or generally described)
is vested or supervised by the Custodian. 9 In the latter two cases,

the Custodian has actually made no finding of ownership at all; or
if he has, it is in the merest general terms, -and the nature of the

ownership interest, *or quantuni of ownership in specific property, has
nowhere been found. The Custodian has merely vested the property

rights, or interests, of the enemy national, whatever they may be. This
distinction first arose in World War I, and is of importance in measur-

ing the Custodian's right to possession of, and interest in, the property._
The courts have held, in the first case above mentioned, that the Custodian's findings are conclusive to the extent that he is entitled to

immediate possession of the property; in te

latter two, the issue of

ownership may be raised for determination by the court before turnover of the property to the Custodian.6" In such cases, if property is
turned over to the Custodian in the absence of such a finding either

by the Custodian or by the court, the protection of the exculpatory
provisions of the statute may not be available.61
that the former owner of the vested property was an enemy national on "national
interest" grounds.
56. See V. 0. 66, Korfund Co. 7 FED. REG. 6608; V. 0. 725, real property, 8 FED.
REG. 1696. Specific property descriptions are strictly construed. Sutherland v. Guaranty
Trust Co., 11 F. (2d) 696 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926).
57. The entire phrase, taken from § 2 (a) of the Executive Order, is: "All property
of any national whatsoever. owned or controlled by, payable or deliverable to, held on
behalf of or on account of or owing to..
58. See V. 0. 764, supra note 52.
59. See V. 0. 725, supra note 56.
60. Garvan v. $20,000 Bonds, 265 Fed. 477 (C. C. A. 2d, 1920), af'd-sub nor.,
Central Union Trust -Co. v. Garvan, 254 U. S. 554 (1921); Miller v. Rouse, 276 Fed.
715 (D. C. N. Y. 1921 ; Rahn v. Garvan, 263 Fed. 909 (S. D. N. Y. 1920); and Stern
v. Newton, 180 Misc. 241, 39 N. Y. S. (2d) 593 (Sup. Ct. 1943). See V. 0. 494, Russ
Estate Co., and amendments, 8 FED. REG. 1693, 12764, 10 FED. REG. 208, 2663. If a
person refuses to turn over property to the Custodian, the latter resorts to a "summary
turnover proceeding" under § 17. of the statute.
61. See note 29, supra. This is for the reason that the order, in such a case, does not
require specific property to be turned over, so that it cannot be said to be an "instruction
or direction" of the Custodian to such effect. Th Custodian may, of course, make the
necessary additional finding of ownership dehors the vesting order, as for-example in a
"Turnover Directive" (Form A. P. C. 34), or other order. See V. 0. 29, 7 FED. REG.
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The basic distinction between "asset" and "interest" vestings is also
important in determining the effect of the vesting order on the property
involved. In the former case, the asset itself is vested and becomes
government property, with many, if not all, of the incidents thereof. 62
In the latter case, the Custodian is vested only with an interest therein,
which may or may not be defined or described, and the property retains its private character. These considerations have varying consequences when applied to business enterprises.
B. Domestic Corporations
In the case of corporations organized under the laws of one of the
several states, some or all of the capital stock or shares of which are
owned by enemy nationals, the Custodian normally vests only such
stock or shares, 3 thus succeedng to the rights of the enemy national
as stockholder." But if the degree of enemy ownership is sufficiently

-

4633 and A. P. C. Special Order No. 1. July 16, 1942 (J. M. Lehmann Co., Inc.), see
note 75 infra. If the specific property is known to be in fact owned by the enemy, or
the undetermined enemy interest therein is in fact 100%, the danger is academic. Cf.
Great Northern Ry. v. Sutherland, 273 U. S. 182 (1927).
62. ". . . such interest on property shall be held, used, administered, liquidated, sold,
or otherwise dealt with in the interest of and for the benefit of the United States. . .(§ 5 (b)). A vesting order ". . .has the legal effect of transferring completely to the
Custodian for the benefit of the United States. . . ." (the vested property). The Pietro.
Campanella, 47 F. Supp. 374, 377 (D. C. Md., 1942). Title to the property or interest
vested is completely transferred to the Custodian. Cummings v. Deutsche Bank, 300,
U. S. 115 (1921); United States v. Borax Consolidated, 62 F. Supp. 220 (N. D. Cal.
1945); A. P. C. General Counsels Opinion F-12, Feb. 6, 1946, and cases cited. Whether
the property vested becomes government property for all purposes is a much-mooted
question, the implications of which are numerous, to say the least. Various aspects of
the question as it affects business enterprises will be discussed herein.
63. Of the 408 business enterprises in which the Custodian has vested interests, 291
are in the form of stock in domestic corporations-. CUsToDIAN's 1944 REPORT 26, 1945.
REPORT 33.

64. Great Northern Ry. v. Sutherland, 273 U. S. 182 (1927); Sutherland v. Selling,
16 F. (2d) 865 (C. C. A. 9th, 1926), cert. denied, 273 U. S. 760 (1927) ; Silesian American
Corp. v. Alien Property Custodian, 156 F. (2d) 793 (C. C. A. 2d, 1946). The CUSTODIN's.
1944 REPORT, 26, refers to this as an "interest" rather than an "asset" vesting. This.
classification seems questionable in the light of the distinction discussed above. The
stock itself, and not an interest therein, represents the intangible property or asset vested.
As to it, all the necessary findings of ownership prerequisite to the Custodian's right
to immediate possession have been made, and no question remains for the Court to.
decide. True, the stock represents an "interest" in the enterprise, but not in the same
sense. Shares of stock may be vested by the Custodian, regardless of the existence,
physical location or situs of the stock certificates under local law or the UmoaM STOCK
TRANsFER AcT. Columbia Brewing Co. v. Miller, 281 Fed. 289 (C. C. A. 5th, 1922);
Miller v. Kaliwerke, etc., 283 Fed. 746 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922); Garvan v. Marconi Wireless
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"substantial", it may result in a finding or determination by the Custodian that the corporation itself is an enemy national, within the
meaning of the Executive Order."' May such a finding be attacked?
Only a strong factual showing that, prior to vesting, the corporation was not controlled by, acting for or on behalf of, or a cloak
for, an enemy national, would seem to have any hope of success.
The difficulties of overcoming a determination of enemy nationality
made on the ground of "national interest" are obvious'enough. With-

out such facts, the attack must of necessity be directed to the definition
in the Executive Order, rather than to the action of the Custodian.
Moreover, the additional finding may be necessary to bring the business enterprise as a whole within the ambit of the Custodian's regulatory

(or supervisory) power."

Since there is no taking beyond the enemy

national stock interest, the attack would resolve itself into one on the

power to regulate or supervise (a constitutional question) , 7 or on a
charge that the regulation or supervision exercised was arbitrary, unreasonable, or discriminatory in some respect, and damage would have
to be shown.6 s
Tel. Co., 275 Fed. 486 (D. C. N. J. 1921); Hicks v. Baltimore & Ohio Ry, 10 F. (2d)
606 (D. C. Md. 1926). A. P. C. General Counsel's Opinion F-12, Feb. 6, 1946. The
vesting probably would not prevail, however, against bona fide non-enemy holders of
certificates without notice. Cf. Schrijver v. Sutherland, 19 F. (2d) 688 (App. iD. C.
1927), cert. denied, 275 U. S. 546 (1927) ; Miller v. Kaliwerke, supra, at p. 757. If the
stock certificates are physically located abroad, interesting questions of situs in the conflict of laws may arise in litigation between the American Custodian and those of allied
countries. Disconto-Gesellschaft v. United States Steel Corp., 267 U. S. 22 (1925) ; Miller v.
Kaliwerke, etc., supra; Secretary of State v. Alien Property Custodian, S. C. P. 169
(Can. 1931); Sutherland v. Adm'r. of German Property, 1 K. B. 423 (1934) ; cf. United
States v. Pink, 315 U. S. 203 (1942). See also RESTATEMNNT, CoNrLIcT oF LAWs (1934)
§§ 49, 53, 261, 262; 1 BEALE, CoNrLIcT or LAWS (1935) § 53.1; 2 BEALE, supra § 262.1;
Mills v. Jacobs, 333 Pa. 231, 4 A. (2d) 152 (1939) ; and Rabel, Situs Problems in Enemy
Property Measures (1945) 11 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 118.
65. Section 10 (a), incorporating by reference the definitions of § 5 of ExEc. ORDER
8389, as amended. See notes 34 to 39, supra. A domestic corporation is a "person" within
these definitions, but is not within enemy or enemy-occupied territory, nor is it an
enemy citizen or subject.
66. The distinction is, of course, between interests subject to vesting and interests
subject to regulation or supervision. See notes 29 and 35 supra. In nearly all cases of
vesting of interests in business enterprises pri6r to Exec. Order 9567 the Custodian also
assumed supervision of the enterprise itself, either by a separate supervisory order or by
appropriate additional language in the vesting order. See CUSTODIAN's 1944 REPORT, 11, 25;
1945 REPORT 8-9, 31.
67. United States v. Von Clemm, 136 F. (2d) 968 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943); Harriman
v. Federal Reserve Bank, 55 F. Supp. 801 (E. D. Pa. 1944); McNulty, op. cit. supra
note 18.
68. It may be argued that the corporation has been damaged in its business repu-

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol.

15

A different question would arise, however, if the Custodian made
use of his own finding, by a species of administrative bootstrap lifting,
to vest assets owned by the corporation itself.6 9 Even if the corporation's stock is 100% enemy-owned,70 the question may not be academic, in so far as the rights of creditors are concerned, for the
creditors of the corporation and those of the individual stockholders
may not be the same. 7 Where outstanding non-enemy stock interests
exist, such a vesting would seem palpably improper, probably giving
to the injured parties rights against the Custodian under Section 9 (a)
of the Trading with the Enemy Act. 72 Only overriding considerations
tation by having been publicly and officially found to be an "enemy national", with
all the non-technical popular connotations of the term. The damnurn may be real enough;
but even if libelous, (cf. Luotto v. Field, 268 App. Div. 227, 50 N. Y. S. (2d) 849
(2d Dep't, 1944) ; Levy v. Gelber, 175 Misc. 746, 25 N. Y. S. (2d) 148 (Sup. Ct. 1941),
it is absque inhiria, since the government is without liability in tort. Schillinger v.
United States, 155 U. S. 163 (1894).
69. The CUSTODIAN'S 1944 REPORT p. 26 n, refers to two cases only in which this was
done. One such case (p. 77) was that of Atlantic Assets Corp., all of whose stock was
vested, V. 0. 84, 7 FED. REo. 7051; V. 0. 2170, 8 FED. REG. 12763. In addition, the
Custodian vested 530,145 shares of stock of Hugo Stinnes Corp., somhe of which were
held by Atlantic Assets Corp., V. 0. 2080, 9 FED. REo. 2504. The World War I statute
did not permit seizure of corporate assets in such cases. See Hamburg-American Co. v.
United States, 277 U. S. 138 (1928).
70. The stock may be owned by one or several enemy nationals.
71. The Custodian would seem to have an obligation to protect the rights of American
creditors of the respective former enemy owners of vested property, which would require
him not to mingle such property, at least in cases where the mingling would cause such
creditor interests to be adversely affected. Creditors of the corporation become, in a
sense, "creditors of the Custodian" by virtue of the vesting; a difference which, under
the Custodian's policy until recently, had important disadvantages, Markham v. Cabell,
325 U. S. 847 (1945). CusTODIAN's 1944 REPORT 140, 141, 1945 REPORT 16, 170. There
is no constitutional right to the payment of debt claims out of enemy property. Miller v.
Robertson, -266 U. S. 243 (1924); Kogler v. Miller, 288 Fed. 806 (C. C. A. 3d, 1923),
and Sec. 34 of the Statute enacted Aug. 8, 1946, restricts the payment of debt claims
to American citizens and residents.
72. The remedy, by suit or claim against the Custodian, is apparently available to
the corporation as well as to the non-enemy stockholders. The corporation was joined
as a party plaintiff in Draeger v. Crowley, 49 F. Supp. 215 (S. D. N. Y. 1943). Despite
the fact that the Custodian's vesting orders uniformly provide in effect that enemy
nationals may not file claims, the Custodian's office has taken the position both in court
(See Government's Brief, p. 49 in Draeger v. Crowley, supra) and as a matter of administrative policy, that the disqualification as to filing does not apply to an attack on the
vesting order in which the finding was made. Where the former non-enemy stockholder
is a "foreign national" under Sec. 5b of the Statute, the remedy of Sec. 9a is probably
not available to him. Silesian American Corp. v. Alien Property Custodian, 156 F. (2d)
793 (C. C. A. 2d, 1946) ; see also Iki v. Markham, unreported, (D. Wash. 1944); Hayden
v. Markham, unreported, (D. Wash. 1944); CUSTODIM'S 1945 REPORT 162.
-
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of national interest should cause the Custodian to disregard the corporate entity in either case.73
It may be that a determination by the Custodian of enemy
ownership of corporate stocks disregards non-enemy property interests in the stock itself. The interests of the secured creditor
in enemy property were accorded some measure of protection under Section 8 (a) of the old statute.74 The section appears to be
applicable to vestings in World War II, despite the amendment
to Section 5 (b). 75 Surrender or loss of possession, even to the
73. Cf. Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298 U. S. 193 (1936); First Bank Stock Corp.
v. Minnesota, 301 U. S. 234 (1937) (tax cases) and 1 FLETCHER CYC. CORPS. (1931)
§§ 41-46. By refusing to vest directly patents owned by business enterprises in which
minority, majority or even 100% stock interests have already been vested, the Custodian
has recognized the necessity of protecting non-enemy stockholder or creditor interests in
the enterprise. See PATENTS AT WORK, A Statement of Policy by the Alien Property
Custodian (1943) 20; Sargeant & Cramer, Enemy Patents (1945) 11 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 92, 105-106; HAxiNms, supra note 15, p. 595-596; CUSTODIANa's 1944 REPORT p.
101, 1945 REPORT 112; Cf. CUSTODINu'S 1943 REPORT 76.
74. Mayer v. Garvan, 270 Fed. 229 (D. Mass. 1920), aff'd, 278 Fed. 27 (C. C. A.
1st, 1922). Cf. Garvan v. $20,000 Bonds, 265 Fed. 477 (C. C. A. 2d, 1920), aff'd sub
nont., Central Union Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U. S. 554 (1921).
75. In the matter of Dorothy Krets Lehman, Final Determination of A. P. C.
Vested Property Claims Committee, supra note 40 at 115, the claimant asserted
a lienor's right to the vested stock under § 8 (a), by virtue of certain orders of the New
York Supreme Court in a matrimonial proceeding under N. Y. CIv. PRAc. ACT § 1171-a.
The claimant had obtained a judgment of separation with alimony from her husband,
the former owner of the vested stock. The orders-referred to, entered prior to the vesting
appointed her matrimonial receiver and sequestrator of her husband's property in the state,
including the stock, and directed the corporation to issue new certificates for the shares to
her. The latter order, however, was made expressly subject to obtaining any necessary permission from federal authorities under § 5 (b). The company resisted the order and the Custodian vested the stock before any further steps were taken. The Committee decided
that the state court orders did not give the claimant any lienor's rights under § 8 (a),
but at most, put the stock in custodia legis, thus making it vestible under § 2 (f) of
the Executive Order.
No cases have yet arisen holding provisions of the old statute inapplicable, and
several decisions, construing other sections, have expressly or impliedly held otherwise: Ex parte Kawato, 317 U. S. 69 (1943), Markham v. Cabell, 325 U. S. 847
(1945); Draeger v. Crowley, 49 F. Supp. 215 (S. D. N. Y. 1943). The way to
test the question, of course, is for the lienor or other secured creditor to assert his
rights under § 8 (a) and retain the property, thus requiring the Custodian to bring a
§ 17 proceeding. Rights under § 9 (a) also exist. Cf. Swiss Bank Corp. v. Markham.
U. S. D. C., S. D. N. Y., Dec. 28, 1945, unreported, C. C. H. War Law Service, Statutes
and Interpretations, par. 9274. Silesian American Corp. v. Alien Property Custodian, 156
F. (2d) 793 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1946), appears to hold, however, that foreign (non-enemy)
nationals under § 5b have no rights under § 8a or 9a.
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Custodian, might well deprive a pledgor of his security rightsJ 6 In
other cases, non-enemy interests in property vested might not come
.within the limits of Section 8 (a), yet should not be without protection.
Enemy-owned corporate stock, might be on deposit with a non-enemy
agent or fiduciary, who may have acquired property rights of value
in the stock by virtue of the instrument creating the relationship. The
exculpatory provisions of the statute would protect the agent or fiduciary from liability for breach of his obligations in acceding to the
demands of the Custodian, but the problem of his own rights remains.
For example, the stock might constitute the corpus of a trust, as to
which the trustees are given voting powers for the purpose of providing continuity to the management of the corporation, in addition
to their normal rights to administer the trust and receive compensation
therefor. The enemy interests might be those of contingent remaindermen, dependent for realization upon events (such as the pre-decease
of life beneficiaries) which have not yet occurred. A direct vesting
of all or part of the stock by the Custodian in such a case would appear not only to destroy the trust, but the rights of the trustees and
the non-enemy beneficiaries as well." Where the trust is a relatively
passive or inactive one, or all the beneficial interests are enemy-owned,
its destruction by vesting action of the Custodian would seem less
open to question. 71 In cases of voting trusts, the Custodian quite
properly vests the enemy-owned voting trust certificates, or the enemyowned, beneficial interests therein, as well as the underlying stock 7
76. Helburn-Thompson Co. v. All Americas Mercantile Corp., 180 App. Div. 167,
167 N. Y. Supp. 711 (1st Dep't 1917). aff'd 223 N. Y. 675, 119 N. E. 1048 (1918);
McCoy v. American Express Co., 253 N. Y. 477, 171 N. E. 749 (1930). The Custodian
may of course regulate or supervise the entire property, including the pledgee's interest
herein, although only the enemy pledgor's interest may be vested. If he vests subject
to the pledge, he may sell free of the pledge if he undertakes to apply the proceeds of
the sale to satisfy the pledge. See V. 0. 494, Russ Estate Co., 8 FED. REG. 1693, 12764;
10 FED. REO. 208, 2663 and A. P. C. Prospectus for Russ Estate Co. 10. But cf. V. 0.
14, Spur Distributing Co., 7 FED. REG. 4399, where the vesting order recites the pledge
of the vested stock but the APC Prospectus for its sale makes no provision for satisfying
the pledge out of the proceeds of sale. Cf. American Potash & Chemical Corp., V. 0.
249, 7 FED. REG. 8757, 9799. CUSTODIAN'S 1944 REPORT 66, and APC Prospectus, p. 16.
10 FED. REG. 208, 2663 and A. P. C. Prospectus, 10.
77. Cf. V. 0. 168, Arabol Manufacturing Co., 7 FED. REG. 8407; In re Weingartner's
Will, 185 Misc. 481, 55 N. Y. S. (2d) 823 (Surr. Ct. 1945).
78. Cf. Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Hicks, 9 F. (2d) 848 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925) cert.
denied, 269 U. S. 583 (1925) ; Stohr v. Wallace, 269 Fed. 827, 835 (S. D. N. Y. 1920)
aff'd 255 U. S. 239 (1921); § 23, N. Y. PERS. PRop. LAW, permitting the termination of
a trust upon consent of all parties beneficially interested.
79. V. 0. 2080, Hugo Stinnes Corp., 9 FED. REG. 2504; CUSTODIAN's 1944 REPORT 77;
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or-he may disregard the trust agreement as a contract with an enemy,
suspended or dissolved by war."0 Even if still effective, the trust and
the action of the trustees are proper subjects of the Custodian's
supervision.
Where vested corporate stock is subject to bona fide prior restrictions
on its sale, in the form of first purchase or figst refusal or option
rights embodied in the charter or by-laws, printed on the stock certificate, or by contract between the parties, it would seem that the
Custodian's vesting would be subject to such rights, at least to the
extent that they are held by non-enemies."' In cases where corporate

stock is subject to prior attachment,

2

it would likewise seem that the

Custodian's vesting is subject to the prior right of the attaching nonenemy creditor, whether or not the attachment is a "lien" within the
provisions of Section 8 (a). In one case," however, the Custodian
was successful in a motion to vacate the attachment. In the only other
reported decision that has been found, the effect to be given to a prior

attachment was not squarely decided.

4

Both cases were ultimately

1945 REPORT 77-78, Miller v. Kaliwerke, 283 Fed. 746 (C. C. A. 5th, 1922) aff'g, Garvan
v. Certain Shares, etc., 276 Fed.' 206 (S. D. N. Y. 1921); Garvan v. $20,000 Bonds, 265
Fed. 477 (C. C. A. 2d, 1920). Cf. V. b. 9, American Bosch Corp., 7 FED. REG. 3768, and
CUSTODIAN'S 1944 REPORT 63.
80. Mumm Champagne v. Eastern Wine Co., 142 F. (2d) 499 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944;
BLAIR, BREACH Or CONTRACTS DUE TO WAR (1940); Diamond, Effect of War on
Contracts with Enemies (1944) 53 YALE L. J. 700; RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) §
335; TRADING wiTH THE ENE= ACT § 7 (b).
81. Cf. Spur Distributing Co., 7 Fed. Reg. 4399, A. P. C. Prospectus; In re Sutherland,
23 F. (2d) 595 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928). The right, however, may have been terminated or
suspended by the war, and its exercise is in any event subject to the Custodian's supervision.
82. After vesting, no attachment or other lien is possible, except as expressly permitted by the Statute. TRADING WITH THE ENEMY ACT §§ 9 (f), 30, 32 (f); Anglo-Continentale Trust M, v. Allegemeine, etc., 171 Misc. 714, 12 N. Y. S. (2d) 964 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
83. Telkes v. Hungarian Natl. Museum, 109 N. Y. L. 3. 2026 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. Co.,
May 24, 1943. Clk's. Index No. 4527-1942). Plaintiff argued that, as an American citizen,
his attachment constituted a prior lien (National Park Bank v. Goddard, 131 N. Y.
494, 30 N; E. 566 (1892) which was entitled to recognition and protection under § 8(a).
The Custodian argued broadly that the attachment was automatically extinguished by
his subsequent vesting. McGeeham, J. allowed that "much can be said in favor of protecting plaintiff's rights", but held for the Custodian "to promote the general welfare"
rather than the advantage of private litigants, on the ground that a contrary result
would "foster poor law" and be an "opening wedge" imposing "very questionable limitations and restrictions on the rights of the Custodian." An appeal.was withdrawn by
stipulation.
84. Murray Oil Co. v. Mitsui, 55 F. Supp. 353 (S. D. N. Y. 1944), aff'd 146 F.
(2d) 381 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944). The Treasury has taken the position that an attachment,
when obtained subsequent to the effective date of Executive Order 8389 as amended, cannot operate to create any lien or interst in blocked property without a license, althougb
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disposed of, however, by stipulations which in effect constituted recognition by the Custodian's office of the validity of ,the attachments.
C. Partnerships
shows perhaps more strikingly than elsewhere
The partnership
the variety and flexibility of the
enterprises,
business
enemy
among
only
in vesting and supervising enemy
powers,
not
Custodian's
present
business enterprises, their property, and enemy interests- therein, but
also in defining and determining the enterprises, persons and interests
subject thereto. Conceivably, an "enemy partnership" doing business
and having vestible property or interests in the United States might
consist of a partnership where one or more of the partners, 1) regardless
of citizenship, resi-des in enemy or enemy-occupied territory;8 6 2) regardless of residence, is an enemy citizen or subject; 3) regardless of
citizenship or residence, is deemed for other reasons to be acting for
or on behalf of, controlled by (or a cloak for), an enemy country or
person within it; 4) regardless of citizenship, residence, agency, cloak
or control, is deemed an enemy national on still other grounds because
the "national interest" so requires.
Under the Trading with the Enemy Act, only partnerships resident
or doing business in enemy or enemy-occupied territory could be classified as "enemy". Partnerships resident or doing business in the
United States, irrespective of whether all or some of the partners were
enemy citizens or subjects, were excluded; although individual partners
who were enemy citizens or subjects, wherever resident, could be classified as "enemy" by Presidential proclamation. sT - At common law as
field 5

the attachment is effective without license for the purpose of acquiring jurisdiction in rein
of the defendant. Polish Relief v. Banca Nationale a Rumaniei, 288 N. Y. 332, 43 N. E.
(2d) 345 (1942); cf. Singer v. Yokohama Specie Bank, 293 N. Y. 542, 58 N. E. (2d) 726

(1944), rearg. denied 294 N. Y. 689, 60 N. E. (2d) 842 (1945) ; Reeves, op. cit. supra
note 2; and Treasury General Rulings 12 and 19 and Public Circular 31, appearing in
Documents, supra, note 2. This rationale, however, was not used in the Telkes case, supra
note 83. The problem beyond the scope of this article, is basic as well as difficult, and
has thus far escaped authoritative analysis in the courts or the legal periodicals.
85. As of June 30, 1945, the Custodian had vested interests in, or the assets of, a
total of 27 enterprises which had been doing business in this country in the partnership
form. Where all partners are determined to be enemy nationals by the Custodian, he may
vest the assets of the enterprise, the interests of all the partners, or both. Partnership assets
have been vested in thirteen such cases. In the remainder, where there were outstanding
interests of non-enemy partners, the Custodian vested only the enemy partners' interests.
All but six of such vestings represented partnership interests of 50% or more in the
enterprise. CusTorA's 1944 REPORT, 26-27; 1945 REPORT 33.
86. See notes 39 and 40 supra.
87. Section 2 (1) (a), (c). Arguably, a partnership, wherever doing business, all of
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well as under the World War I statute, a partnership, one of whose
members was an enemy, was considered automatically dissolved, eo
instanti, upon the declaration of war."' The reasons generally given
were twofold: 1) commercial intercourse with an enemy ("trading")
became illegal, and, in most cases, impossible. Since the partners could
not deal with one another, the carrying on of the partnership business was therefore prevented. 2) If communication or commercial
relations with the enemy partner were possible, 9 it nevertheless
was illegal, since, presumably, benefit would be conferred on the enemy
member by carrying on the partnership. The partnership was therefore
deemed dissolved as a going concern; however, the necessity for liquidation of the enterprise, payment of liabilities and distribution of the
remaining assets to the non-enemy partners according to their respective
interests remained 0
This doctrine was applied by the courts so as to delete the definition of enemy partnership from the statute. Since the partnership
was automatically and instantaneously "dissolved" upon the outbreak
of war, it could not be an "enemy".
Only those individual members
who otherwise satisfied the requirements of the "enemy" definition
could be so considered. The World War I decisions, therefore, give little
or no light on which of the categories listed above would be considered
an "enemy partnership". They do, however, disclose that the Cuswhose partners, wherever resident, were enemy citizens or subjects, could likewise be so
proclaimed.
88. Sutherland v. Mayer, 271 U. S. 272, 286 (1926); Mayer v. Garvan, 270 Fed.
229 (D. Mass. 1920) aff'd, 278 Fed. 27 (C. C. A. 1st, 1922); Hugo Stevenson & Son,
Ltd. v. Aktiengesellschaft, A. C. 239, 118 L. T. R. (N. S.) 126, 115 L. T. R. (N. S.)
594 (1918); Rossie v. Garvan, 274 Fed. 447, 450 (D. C. Conn. 1921). Other agency
relationships are not automatically terminated by war, Aldridge v. Franco-Wyoming
Securities Corp., 31 A. (2d) 246 (Del. Ch. 1943). Cf. Schutte v. Miller, 4 F. (2d) 288,
289 (App. D. C. 1925), where the plaintiff, a non-enemy, had a 59 interest in a New York
partnership and a 20% interest in a German partnership which had, in turn a 50%
interest in the New York firm, but apparently no other assets here. Under the docrtine
of Mayer v. Garvan, supra, plaintiff was-permitted to liquidate the New York firm and
retain his 5%o interest, but no more. The court held that "The Bremen firm is a going
concern," and 'the plaintiff still is a partner therein."
89. As for example, with an individual partner, a citizen or subject of an enemy
country, but resident in the United States, or in non-enemy territory, and proclaimed
an "enemy" by the President, under TRAmNo WITH THE ENuar~t AcT § 2 (1) (c). See
Sutherland v. Mayer, 271 U. S. 272 (1926) at p. 287.
90. Id. at 289, Mayer v. Garvan, 270 Fed. 229, 238 (D. Mass. 1920) aff'd, 274 Fed.
27, 34 -(C. C. A. 1st, 1922). Cf. Kittredge v. Langley, 252 N. Y. 405, 169 N. E. 626
(1930).

91. Mayer v. Garvan, 270 Fed. 229, at 239 (D. Mass. 1920); Rossie v. Garvan, 274
Fed. 447, 453 (D. Conn. 1921).
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todian there resorted to "interest" or "asset" vestings, depending on
whether some or all of the partners were enemies. The partnerships of Reis & Co. and Rossie & Co. contained non-enemy partners, and asset vestings were there held to be improper. 2 On the
other hand, all of the partners of Froelich & Kuttner, a Philippine
partnership, were enemies, and the Custodian's seizure of the assets
was upheld. 3 Asset seizure was similarly sustained in Sorenson v.
Sutherland 4 where two American partners had a share in the profits
but not in the capital, under the partnership agreement. The question
whether the partnership was an "entity" also preoccupied the courts
to some extent in considering questions of liquidation, and suit against
the Custodian under Section 9 (a)."
The Executive Order includes partnership within the definitions of
"person" and "business enterprise". 6 The present Custodian has found
partnerships as well as individual partners to be "enemy nationals"
thereunder, and has vested partnership assets, partners' interests
therein, or both. In Stern v. Newton, he vested assets in this country
presumptively belonging to a French partnership which did business
and had its office in enemy-occupied Paris. 7 After finding these facts,
the Custodian "determined", in the language of the Executive Order,
that the partnership was an 6nemy national. He was held entitled to
immediate possession of the vested- property, against the claim of the
92. Mayer v. Garvan, 270 Fed. 229 (D. Mass. 1920) aff'd, 278 Fed. 27 (C. C. A.
1st, 1922); Rossie v. Garvan, 274 Fed. 447 (D. Conn. 1921). Since the partnership was
not an enemy, its assets could not be seized by the Custodian under § 7 (c), but only
the interest of the enemy partner therein.
93. Froelich & Kuttner v. Sutherland, 22 F. (2d) 870 (App. D. C., 1927).
94. 27 F. Supp. 44 (S. D. N. Y. 1939), rev'd on other grounds, 109 F. (2d) 714
(C. C. A. 2d, 1940) aff'd sub nora., Jackson v. Irving Trust Co., 311 U. S. 494 (1941).
In 1929, the American partners had successfully brought suit under § 9 (a) to recover
a debt due the partnership from a German concern whose American assets had been
seized by the Custodian. Ten years later, the Custodian sought to vacate the decree
on the ground that, since the German partner owned all the assets, including the debt
sued on, the court was without jurisdiction. The district court vacated the decree but
the courts on appeal held that the issue should have been raised in the original proceeding.
and, whether rightly or wrongly decided, the decree was now res judicata.
95. See notes 88, 93 and 94 supra; cf., Waldes v. Basch, 109 Misc. 306, 179 N. Y.
Supp. 713 (Sup. Ct. 1919); UzIaORM PARTNERSHIP Ac', §§ 8, 10, 30. Cf. Note, The
Partnership as a Legal Entity (1941) 41 CoL. L. REV. 698.
96. See notes 5 and 34 supra.
97. V. 0. 155, 7 FED. REG. 7764, 180 Misc. 241, 39 N. Y. S. (2d) 593 (Sup. Ct.
1943). Since the partnership had no office and did no business within the United States,
it was not Within the "business enterprise" definition. In view of the state court proceeding, the property was vestible, however, under § 2 (f) of the Executive Order. See
note 8 supra.
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plaintiff, a French citizen who had resided in this country since prior to

the date of vesting but subsequent to the effective date of the freezing
order, that the property was in fact beneficially owned by him. The
plaihtiff was remitted to his administrative remedy against the Custodian,
where he was ultimately successful." In another case, 9 the Custodian
vested the interests of all the partners (enemy nationals residing in
Hungary) in a partnership doing business in Massachusetts. The vesting order did not in terms assume supervision of the enterprise. A year
later, the Custodian amended his order to vest the assets of the
enterprise and formally undertake its supervision. 100 In the case
of Pass & Company,'' however, where the Custodian also vested all
of the partnership assets, only one of the two partners was found an
enemy national by reason of residence in Germany. The Custodian
then found the partnership an enemy national on the ground that it
was controlled by him, and the other partner an enemy national on
the sole ground and to the extent that, as a partner, she was "acting
directly or indirectly for the benefit of and on behalf of" the partner
resident in Germany. 02 Unless, perhaps, the vesting can be justified
98. A. P. C. Divesting Order No. 94, May 19, 1944, 9 FED. REG. 8084; "Final Determination of A. P. C. Vested Property Claims Committee," May 3, 1944. Plaintiff had
resided here since since December 1940.

The effective date of ExEc. ORDER 8389 as

amended for France is June 17, 1940 § 3 (c). He was therefore a "foreign national"
within the meaning of that order and of § 5 (b) of the Statute, although not an
"enemy national" under the Executive Order 9095 as amended.
99. Pettingell Machine Co., V. 0. 111, 7 FED. REG. 7058.
100. 8 FED. REG. 13350. The real estate on which the enterprise was located was
vested in the same manner (V. 0. 725, 8 FED. REG. 1696), except that the subsequent
amendment (8 FED. REG. 8563) included no supervisory provisions. The real estate was
apparently not included among the assets of the partnership, but was owned jointly
by the same persons. See also Semmes (Kiyono) Nurseries, V. 0. 93, 7 FED. REG. 6609,
9. FED. REG. 5613, and real estate, V. 0. 1673, 8 FED. REG. 9080; and Southern Cotton
Co. Ltd., V. 0. 59, 145 and 394, 7 FED. REG. 5743, 7543, 9801, where the Custodian,
by successive orders, vested all the interests of all the partners in, and all debts owing
to them by, a Texas limited partnership, but did not directly vest the assets of the
enterprise. By public notice, however, the Custodian announced that he had become the
"sole owner" of all its assets, and that the partnership (in dissolution) would thereafter
be operated as a "sole proprietorship" by the Custodian. Unless the partnership could
be considered an "entity" under state law, his vesting of course had the effect claimed
for it, without the necessity of directly vesting the partnership -assets. See notes 93 and
95 supra; Cf. CUSToDIAN'S 1945 REPORT 32.
101. V. 0. 1332, 8 FED. REG. 9074.
102. Section 10 (a) (i)' of the Executive Order. Domestic law makes the partner an
PARTNERSmP ACT, § 9. Compare the holding in
agent of the partnership. UNrUFoR
Alexewicz v. General Aniline & Film Corp., 181 Misc. 181, 43 N. Y. S. (2d) 713 (Sup.
Ct. 1943), discussed in Lourie, op. cit. supra note 40, 390 n., where the plaintiff was
held to be "acting on behalf of" the corporation, an enemy national with whom he had

-
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on the ground that all of the partnership capital was contributed by
the partner residing in Germany, 10 3 the Custodian's action seems
questionable. If the Custodian can use his power to make determinations
applying the definition of enemy nationality, thus to extend his vesting
power, a way has been found around Mayer v. Garvan,0 4 and little
becomes of the statutory admonition to regulate property in which
there is an enemy national interest, but to vest only the interest.""
Use of the definitions in the two Executive Orders 0 6 as the basis
for a determination that a partnership is an enemy national, wisely
disregards the dissolution doctrine of the earlier decisions. The
World War I rule that a partnership dissolved as a going concern, was
no longer an "entity" for purposes of the enemy definition, ignored
reality as well as the language of the statute. And some further extension of the "agency" and "control" definitions in application has
doubtless been necessary and advisable. Indiscriminate determinations
of enemy nationality on "control" or "national interest" grounds, howan employment contract. In suing the corporation for breach of the contract, however,
the plaintiff was obviously acting on his behalf.
103. See Sorenson v. Sutherland, note 94 supra. The vesting order is silent on this
point. Even if the other partner's interest were confined to the profits only, it would
seem to be an interest entitled to the protection of § 9 (a), regardless of whether she
had rights as a liquidating partner under § 8 (a).
104. See note 74 supra. By invoking § 8 (a) of the Statute, the court there protected the interest of the non-enemy partner against asset seizure by the Custodian.
The ground given by the court was that, on dissolution, such partner had a "liquidating
lien." It may be questioned whether this is properly a lien at all, and if so, a lien of
the nature prescribed by § 8 (a). See the well-reasoned opinion of the A. P. C. Vested
Property Claims Committee in Matter of Batzouroff, Claim 1737, Docket 23, Tentative
Determination, Sept. 15, 1944 relying on an unreported opinion of the Supreme Court
for the District of Columbia in Schutte v. Miller, (affirmed-on other grounds,) 4 F. (2d)
288 (App. D. C. 1925) and refusing to follow Mayer v. Garvan. The Custodian had
vested all of the United States assets of a Bulgarian partnership, V. 0. 1583, Batzouroff
& Cie, 8 FED. REr. 076. The unsuccessful claimant was one of the partners and a Bulgarian citizen, resident in Paris until 1939, in this country thereafter. Perhaps no "lien"
existed, but no sufficient reason appears for substituting the Custodian as liquidator of
the partnership, in place of the American resident partner, who was not even mentioned
in the vesting order.
105. TRADI.G WITH THE ENEmY ACT, as amended, § 5 (b). See notes 29 and 31 supra.
Cf., V. 0.-164, Rikimaru Bros. & Co., 7 FED. REG. 8666, wherein the Custodian vested all
right, title and interest of both enemy national partners in a partnership which had made,
prior to vesting, an assignment to a non-enemy for the benefit of creditors. The vesting
order was made expressly subject to the right, title and interest of the assignee. The
Custodian could, -of course, supervise the activity of the assignee, although the vesting
order did not undertake to do so.
106. See note 96 supra.
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ever, based solely on residence in enemy-occupied territory, 10 7 or on
enemy citizenship regardless of residence, °8 or even on residence in
enemy territory, 09 as a basis of vesting, seem unwarranted by the
necessities of the situation, when other measures are at hand. The
broader powers given the Custodian in World War II make it unnecessary to go to this other extreme by jeopardizing non-enemy" interests
which can be subjected to supervision and control without the necessity
of vesting."10
(To Be Concluded)
107.
108.

Stern v. Newton, supra note 97.
V. 0. 764, Katsuji Onishi, 8 FED. REG. 2452.
109. Pass & Co., V. 0. 1332, 2 FED. REG. 9074.
110. Cf., V. 0. 2700, S. M. lida 9 FED. REG. 741, where the Custodian vested only
the right, title and interest of the partner resident in Japan, although the other partner,
resident in Hawaii, was also a subject of Japan, and had been interned. The Custodian
also undertook supervision of the partnership. As it will be seen, disregard of the partnership as an "entity" in dissolution, either by vesting its assets, or the interest of all
the partners, makes for significant differences in administration and liquidation of the
partnership property.

